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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff has no objection to any statement of fact
presented by Highland City in its Statement of Relevant Facts.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Highland City's argument that it is immune from suit
because the Plaintiff's action purportedly arises out of the
approval of the plat map is without merit. The Plaintiff's injuries
arose out of Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection.
While Highland City was also negligent in failing to catch its own

negligence before approving the plat and in failing to inspect the
Intersection, the efficient force which caused Plaintifffs injuries
was Highland City's defective design of the Intersection. To hold
otherwise would allow Highland City to absolve itself of liability
through issuance of a self-serving permit or approval.
Loveland v. Orem Citv. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), does not
apply to the present case because in Loveland, the Court held that
a municipality is immune from suit against allegations that it
failed to catch the negligence of the developer. There is nothing
in Loveland which can be construed as granting immunity from
allegations that the municipality was the negligent party. Highland
City is asking this Court to carve out an area where it should be
allowed the freedom to act negligently without accountability.
However,

the

Utah

Legislature

has

already

mandated

that

municipalities do not have immunity against allegations that they
negligently designed, constructed or maintained streets and roads.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) ; see also Biaelow v. Incrersoll, 618
P.2d 50 (Utah 1980); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975);
Carroll v. State Road Comm.. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972).
Bennett v. Bow Valley Development, 797 P.2d 419 (Utah
1990), also stands for the proposition that a municipality cannot
be held liable for failing to catch the negligence of a developer.
However, it is inappropriate for Highland City to extrapolate this
2

principle to shield itself from its own negligence.
Highland City's final argument is that it cannot be held
liable because the developer should have informed Highland City of
the poorly designed Intersection. This argument, made for the first
time on appeal, is completely unsupported by any case law or
statutory authority. It is nothing more than a conclusory statement
made in a last ditch effort to avoid liability. However, assuming
Highland City is correct in this statement of law, it creates
genuine issues of material fact which must be decided by the trier
or fact. The trier of fact must determine whether or not industry
standards require the developer to inform the municipality of the
entity's poor design. The trier of fact must also rule on whether
the developer in this case did, in fact, inform Highland City of
the defective design of the Intersection.
Even if the developer negligently failed to point out
Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection, the law of
intervening
Highland

cause

City

holds

of

that

liability

this
if

failure

the

would

developer's

not

relieve

failure

was

foreseeable. Godesky v. Provo City, 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). The
trier

of

fact must

determine

whether

or not

the

developer's

intervening negligence was foreseeable. If so, Highland City is
still liable for its negligent design of the Intersection.
Highland City has waived immunity for the allegations in

3

Plaintiff's Complaint.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
OVERVIEW
In her original memorandum, Plaintiff challenged Highland
City to respond to one simple question: Why would the Legislature
allow municipalities the freedom to negligently design roads in
private subdivisions which provide access to public roads when it
would not allow municipalities to negligently design public roads
without accountability?

Biaelow v. Inaersoll. 618 P.2d 50 (Utah

1980); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. State
Road C O M . . 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972).
Highland City never addressed this challenge. Highland
City never argues that such a distinction should be made between
private roads negligently designed by the municipality and public
roads negligently designed by the municipality. Yet this is the key
issue in this case, for to grant immunity to Highland City for its
actions in this case is to carve out an area where municipalities
are free to act negligently without accountability. Plaintiff
respectfully contends that Highland City has presented no arguments
which suggest that the Legislature intended to allow municipalities
a "freebie11, an area where it cannot be held accountable for its
negligence. Instead, all of the case law and all of the statutory
authority lead to the opposite conclusion. A Municipality should be
4

held liable whether the road it negligently designs is a public or
a private road. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989).
Also absent from Highland City's brief is any denial that
it indeed designed the Intersection. It appears that the parties
are in agreement that Highland City negligently designed the
Intersection, as testified to by the developer, Paul Frampton, and
Richard Clayton. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 12-13);
R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 14-15). Thus, the
central issue in this appeal is not whether Highland City was
negligent in designing the Intersection. The parties agree on that
fact. The issue is whether or not the Utah Legislature has granted
Highland City the freedom to negligently design roads in private
subdivisions which provide access to public roads.
POINT I
HIGHLAND CITY HAS WAIVED IMMUNITY FOR ITS
NEGLIGENT DESIGN OF THE INTERSECTION
Highland City's first argument is that its actions are
protected by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (c) (1989) because it
merely approved the plat. But as demonstrated

at length in

Plaintiff's opening brief, this section is irrelevant because the
cause of action did not "arise out of" Highland City's approval of
the plat. Instead, this cause of action arose out of Highland
City's negligent design of the Intersection. (Appellant's Brief,
pp. 32-29) . Highland City is still trying to "torture the facts" of
5

this case in order to pigeonhole this action into a category for
which immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733 P.2d 126
(Utah 1987) . The Utah Supreme Court has already held that such
arguments are improper. Id.
Here, there can be no doubt that the cause of action
arose out of Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection.
Highland City is correct that it was also negligent in approving
the plat containing the Intersection the city negligently designed.
But the actual and proximate cause of the injury to the Plaintiff
was Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection.
To hold otherwise would allow Highland City to absolve
its own negligence by issuance of a self-serving approval. The law
of governmental immunity could plummet to the point where every
governmental entity issues a statement at the end of each road
project indicating that indeed it was negligent in many aspects,
and that the legislature had concededly waived immunity for those
negligent acts, but nevertheless the governmental body can not be
held liable because the entity has reviewed its own actions,
decided that it does not want to be held liable, and has issued a
permit or approval forever absolving its employees of liability and
precluding actions by private citizens injured by that negligence.
To any subsequent act for negligence in the design and construction
of the road, the governmental entity would simply argue that it had
6

approved the negligent acts and, therefore, immunity is retained.
This despite the Utah Legislature's expressed intent to
hold governmental entities liable for their actions with respect to
roads and streets. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989). Highland City's
end run around the statute should fail. The Utah Legislature's
express intent to hold governmental entities liable for their
negligent construction of roads should prevail.
Now we turn to Loveland v. Orem City. 746 P.2d 763 (Utah
1987) . Highland City argues that in Loveland. the Utah Supreme
Court held that municipalities cannot be held liable for negligence
related to private developments. The Intersection was a private
development. Therefore, Highland City cannot be held liable.
However,

Highland

City

fails

to

capture

the

key

distinction between Loveland and the present case. For clarity,
Plaintiff will present the Lovelands' exact argument:
The Lovelands urge that this case comes within
the waivers of immunity for several reasons.
They claim that North Unions's canal comes
within the definition of a culvert and argue
that the minutes of the City Council meetings
indicate that the City was aware of the canal
that ran through the Executive
Estates
subdivision and the potential danger it
presented to that subdivision's residents.
Additionally, they claim that the Executive
Estates subdivision is a "public improvement"
which, without adequate implementation of a
directive to fence the canal, created a
dangerous condition which resulted in their
son's death.
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Loveland, 746 P.2d at 776. Thus, the essence of the Lovelands1
argument was that Orem City failed to regulate or monitor the
developer to make sure he protected residents of the subdivision
from the culvert by fencing the canal. In other words, Orem City
failed to catch the negligence of the developer. In the instant
case, Highland City was the negligent party because it designed the
Intersection, and thereby accepted the duty to do the job properly.
Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). The only
negligence Highland City failed to catch was its own.
Thus, there is no support in Loveland for Highland City's
position that it is immune from its own negligence. Loveland stands
for the principle that a municipality is immune from allegations
that it failed to catch the negligence of a developer. Highland
City twists that principle into an unrecognizable position, arguing
that because it does not have to catch the negligence of a
subdivision developer, that gives it free reign to negligently
design the subdivision itself and it is immune from suit for its
own negligence.
Deeply submersed in Highland City's argument is its true
contention with regard to Loveland. Highland City is arguing that
it should have the freedom

to imperil

citizens through its

negligence and should be allowed to absolve itself of liability.
However, Highland City has not provided any public policy support
8

for that contention. Highland City also lacks statutes or case law
supporting its position.
On the other hand, Plaintiff has provided several policy
arguments as to why this should be avoided, not the least of which
isf a municipality should not be immune from suit for imperilling
residents living in private developments when the Utah Legislature
has already stripped the same entity of immunity for imperilling
those

using

public

roads. These

policy

arguments

have

their

foundation is both statute and case law, for the Utah Legislature
and the Utah Supreme Court have consistently held that governmental
entities should be held liable for the negligent design of streets
and roads. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1989) ; Biaelow v. Incrersoll,
618 P.2d 50

(Utah 1980); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah

1975); Carroll v. State Road Comm.. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972).
Plaintiff respectfully submits that if Highland City is
to be granted the freedom to act negligently, this should be based
on sound public policy rather than a few sentences taken out of
context from an easily distinguishable case. The fact that Highland
City has not marshalled one policy argument lending credence to its
position is good evidence that the Legislature never intended to
grant

municipalities

immunity

when

they

negligent

design

subdivisions.
Highland

City

also relies

9

on

Bennett

v. Bow Valley

Development, 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990). In Bennett. the plaintiff
alleged that Bow Valley was negligent in "filling natural drainage
channels,

failing

to comply

with

grading

plans,

failing to

construct roads in a safe manner and with proper compaction, and
failing to revegetate cut slopes." Id. at 421. The allegations
against

Provo City were that

it "released

improvement

bonds

furnished by Bow Valley without requiring it to make the necessary
improvements in the subdivision and that this constituted negligent
release of the bonds." Id.
To compare Bennett to this case is to compare apples and
oranges. The sole allegation against the municipality was that it
failed to catch the negligence of the developer. There was no
contention

that

Provo

City

filled

the

drainage

channels or

negligently constructed the road. The developer did these things.
The City simply failed to make sure that each task was done right.
The developer was the negligent party. In the instant case,
Highland City, not the developer, was the negligent party. Once
again, the mere fact that the Utah Supreme Court has held that
municipalities are immune from allegations that they failed to
catch the negligence of others cannot be translated into immunity
for the municipality's own negligent design of a road.
Highland City asks this Court to focus on two words in
the Bennett decision—"receipt and analysis". (Highland City's
10

Brief, p. 11) . From these two words, Highland City argues that the
Utah Supreme Court has expressly authorized

it to negligently

design subdivisions. From these two words, Highland City contends
that the Legislature must have meant that municipalities could
negligently

design

roads

even

though

the

Legislature

already

mandated in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1992) that they could not
negligently design public roads.
However, there is no support in the Bennett case for this
proposition. There is no language in that opinion which could be
remotely construed to mean that the Legislature intended to allow
municipalities an area where they were free to act negligently. All
the Court held was that if the developer was the designer and the
negligent party, then the plaintiff can't bring suit against the
municipality. There is no language which precludes suit against the
municipality if that is the entity that was negligent in designing
or constructing the road.
In a last ditch effort to avoid liability for its own
negligence, Highland City argues, for the first time on appeal,
that the developer was truly the negligent party. Highland City
argues that the developer was negligent in that it should have
informed Highland City of the City's negligence and requested that
the Intersection be relocated to a safer location.
There are two problems with this argument. First, there

11

is absolutely no support for the proposition that a developer must
inform the municipality of the municipality's negligence. Highland
City

not

only

fails to provide

any

legal

support

for its

proposition, but it also fails to provide any expert opinion
evidence suggesting that industry standards require the developer
to "cure" the negligence of the municipality. Highland City could
no doubt argue that such a contention has merit. However, Plaintiff
could just as easily argue that the developer should be allowed to
assume that when the municipality changes a plat, it has properly
engineered the plat to insure that it is safe. Because this
argument was raised for the first time on appeal, the parties are
unprepared to present evidence to this Court on this proposition.
Instead, Highland City creates genuine issues of material
fact warranting reversal of the summary judgment. The trier of
fact, after hearing all relevant expert testimony and other
evidence, is the proper entity to determine whether or not industry
standards require the developer to inform the municipality of the
City's negligent act. The trier of fact is the proper entity to
determine whether or not the developer informed Highland City of
its negligence in this case. Additionally, even if the developer
was negligent, the trier of fact must apportion fault between the
negligent municipality, Highland City, and the negligent developer.
Because summary judgment was granted before trial, the
12

jury never resolved these issues, which are critical to Highland
City's theory that the developer negligently

failed to cure

Highland City's negligence. This cause of action should be remanded
so that the trier of fact can resolve these key factual issues.
The second problem with Highland City's argument is that
it assumes that because the developer negligently failed to inform
the municipality of the municipality's negligence, the municipality
is freed from fault. In other words, Highland City is arguing that
the developer's negligence was an intervening cause which absolves
Highland City of liability.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

held

with

respect

to

"intervening causes" that:
An intervening negligent act does not
automatically become a superseding force that
relieves the original actor of liability. The
earlier actor is charged with the foreseeable
negligent acts of others. Therefore, if the
intervening negligence is foreseeable, the
earlier negligent act is a concurring cause.
Godeskv v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). Also, in
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), the
Utah Supreme Court held that "[a] person's negligence is not
superseded

by

the

negligence

of

another

if

the

subsequent

an

intervening

negligence of another is foreseeable." Id. at 219.
By

arguing

that

the

developer

was

negligent force, Highland City creates additional genuine issues of
13

material facte A trier of fact must decide whether or not the
failure of the developer to catch Highland City's negligence was a
foreseeable act. If so, then Highland City's negligence is not
absolved by the developer's subsequent negligence.
Thus, Highland City's argument that it cannot be held
liable is contingent upon several genuine issues of material fact
which have never been addressed to any trier of fact. It is
improper for Highland City to make its bald statements of nonliability before this Court. Highland City must prove these issues
to the trier of fact.
Highland

City

has

never

denied

that

it

in

fact

negligently designed the Intersection. Highland City has also
presented no evidence, legal support, or policy support which would
suggest that it should be immune from its negligence.
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully
asserts that Highland City should not be immune from suit against
allegations that it negligently designed the Intersection because
it would not be immune from suit if the Intersection was a public
road. As such, the trial court's entry of summary judgment should
be reversed, and the case remanded.
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POINT II-IV
PLAINTIFF CONCEDE8 THAT HIGHLAND CITY CANNOT
BE HELD LIABLE FOR FAILING TO MAINTAIN OR SIGN
11500 NORTH.
In Points II through IV, Highland City argues that it had
no duty to maintain and sign the Intersection. Plaintiff did not
present these issues in the Statement of Issues presented in her
opening brief. The reason is that after the motion for summary
judgment was granted

and the docketing

statement was filed

identifying the issues, this Court held, in Jones v. Bountiful
City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), that a municipality has no
duty to sign public roads. However, once the municipality decided
to sign a road, it had a duty to do so in a non-negligent manner.
Id. at 560. Applying this principle here, it appears Plaintiff has
no claim against Highland City for failure to maintain or sign the
road since it was Utah County which accepted the duty to sign the
road.
POINT V
UTAH CODE ANN. S 63-30-10(1)(d) (1989)
RELATING TO NEGLIGENT INSPECTION BY A
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS
CASE BECAUSE THE CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT ARISE
OUT OF THE NEGLIGENT INSPECTION,
Highland City also argues that its true failing in this
case was not the negligent design of the Intersection, or even the
negligent approval of the plat map. Instead, Highland City now
15

argues that its truly negligent act was that it failed to "inspect"
the Intersection.
As with Highland City's contention that it was negligent
in "approving" the platf this argument must fail because the cause
of action did not "arise out of" the negligent inspection. Instead,
the cause of action arose out of Highland City's negligent design
of the Intersection.

Without undue repetition, Highland City

should not be allowed to "torture the facts" of this case into a
category for which immunity is retained. Ingram v. Salt Lake City.
733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). The efficient force that injured the
Plaintiff was not Highland City's subsequent failure to discover
its own negligence through inspections prior to issuance of the
permit. Instead, the actual and proximate cause of Plaintiff's
injuries was Highland City's negligent design of the Intersection.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully asserts that Highland City is not
immune from suit for the negligent design of the Intersection. As
such, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this matter be remanded
to the trial court for a trial on the merits.
DATED this 31

day of March, 1993.
MORGAN & HANSEN

o
Stephen G. Morgan
Attorney for Plaintif
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